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Albanian Institute for International Studies
Italy's relationship with Albania is a recurrent theme of Albanian
foreign policy debates. While points of view differ,' there is no escaping
the fact that Italy is of primary importance to Albania because of cultural
links, migratory pattems, foreign direct investment and security factors.
Hence, bilateral cooperation with Italy has been high on the agenda of
consecutive post-communist Albanian govemments. But, the Italian per-
spective towards Albania has been a great deal more ambiguous and
fraught with intemal tensions that flow from two sources. First, Italy's
"Albania policy" has been very active in supplying economic and secu-
rity aid to Albania and has made Italy's voice an important one in
Tirana, However, after the initial optimism abated, Italy has tended to
react rather than act on Albanian affairs mainly due to the fact that it
perceived Albania as a source of potential security threats rather than a
potential partner with whom it could do long-term business. Second,
Italy's approach to Albania has been negatively conditioned by its re-
gional policy. For economic and strategic reasons, Italy's regional policy
has focused on Serbia as the security Schwerpunkt of the Balkans, While
the goal of stabilizing Serbia is a sensible one, Italian actions on the
ground have often weighed in favour of untenable solutions (i,e, keeping
the Yugoslav Federation together or shoring up the Milosevic regime),
thus harming Italian interests in the long-run. The tensions within the
Albert Rakipi is Chainnan of Albanian Institute for Intemational Studies (AIIS) a think
tank based in Tirana, Albania. Rakipi followed a doctoral program in Intemational
Relations at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, Previously he has been Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania and a career diplomat. He also teaches as a
part time professor at the Tirana University, Faculty of History and Philology, Rakipi is
the author of a number of academic works on issues dealing with democratization in the
Balkans, weak states and state building processes, democracy and security in the region.
Contact e-mail: arakipi@aiis-albania.org.
349
350 EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY
Albania policy as well as between it and the regional policy have ulti-
mately harmed Italian interests in the Westem Balkans and have reduced
its role as an agent of change. There exists a gap between the expecta-
tions for intense, dynamic and positive Italian involvement in Albania
and the actual low-key levels of bilateral cooperation.
This paper examines Albanian Italian relations in the post commu-
nist era,in their three dimensions: political, economic and security.
Methodologically, this examination occurs within the context of Euro-
Atlantic integration. That is to say, the paper takes into account the role
of Italy as a front line EU state, and one of the strongest NATO mem-
bers, whereas Albania and other Westem Balkan states have been
committed to the EU integration process. From this perspective, devel-
opments witbin the EU, the EU approach towards the region, and the
role Italy plays in the process provide the dynamic background within
which bilateral relations ought to be analyzed. Tracing the tensions and
contradictions in each of these perspectives, it concludes that Italy would
benefit if it upgraded its "Albania policy" from threat management to a
clearer long-term vision of partnership. However, it argues that the most
effective way for achieving a mutually-beneficial partnership is to craft
the pursuit of Italian interests in Albania within a larger vision of Italian
Ostpolitik. Given that Albania will continue to remain important to Italy
not only because of the "strength through weakness" of the Albanian
position vis-a-vis its neighbours but also because of the economic and
security benefits of seamless cooperation between the two countries, an
Italian Ostpolitik^ that encompasses the region as a whole rather than its
individual parts would be a more effective tool to further Italian, EU and
regional interests.
Following the demise of the communist regime, Albanian-Italian
relationships iiave been influenced by three main factors: the historical
legacy of bilateral relationships, regional instability and the grave inter-
nal crises that accompanied Albania's transition to democracy. Histori-
cally, the Otranto Strait between the two countries has served more as a
communication bridge than as a barrier to cooperation.3 Starting with the
Ottoman invasion, Albanian migration to Italy created diaspora commu-
nities that powerfully influenced the creation of Albanian national
consciousness and facilitated Italian cultural penetration in the Albanian
worldview. Despite some historical problems such as the Fascist
invasion of Albania, this worldview has remained particularly open and
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welcoming to Italy, From a cultural and human perspective, geographi-
cal proximity has favoured and encouraged permanent communication
between the two nations,'* On the other hand, relations between the two
sovereign states have been powerfully influenced by the geopolitical
setting of both countries: every strong power that has arisen in the
Apennine peninsula has had the tendency to expand into the Balkans by
using Albania as a bridgehead. On the other hand, whenever a powerful
state has emerged in the Balkan Peninsula, it has tended to reach the
Adriatic coast and to use Albania as a springboard for expansion to the
West,5 In more recent times, although there is a clear tendency for geo-
economics to supersede geo-politics, the geopolitical setting has
remained an important factor that helps explain' modem relations
between the two countries especially when considering the way Italy
views Albania,
Secondly, the violent instability that tumed the Balkans into a secu-
rity importing region undermined the capacity to build long-lasting,
institutionalized relationships between the two countries and favoured
quick, reactive actions on the part of Italy to deal with the regular flare-
ups in Balkan violence. Economic cooperation became low priority
while crisis management understandably topped the Italian regional
policy list. Despite recent improvements, the lack of a clear status for
Kosovo, the ambiguity of the relationship between Serbia and Monte-
negro and Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutional fragility have created a
perception of insecurity in Famesina's conceptualization of Western
Balkans.
Last, but not least the political, social and economic crises of post
communist Albania, which have been followed by massive migration
waves of Albanians towards Italian coasts have played a decisive role in
bilateral relations. Not only have they prompted Italy to respond quickly
to the dynamic changes in Albanian security, but they have also had a
powerful impact on the way Italy perceived Albania. The latter has
proved a powerful conditioner on Italian policies towards Albania. The
Italian view of Albania as a source of instability and security threat has
created expectations of unpredictability for bilateral relations and, has
kept Italian policy-making in "emergency gear" even when Albanian
realities were conducive of more long-term cooperative approaches.
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1.1 The Political Dimension
The first non-communist Albanian Govemment formed after the
elections of March 31, 1992 actively sought to put an end to the long and
extreme isolation of the country, through establishing and strengthening
relations with the West. For historical and cultural reasons as well as
bilateral interest, the establishment of a mutually beneficial partnership
with Italy became one of the primary objectives of Albanian diplomacy.
This openness in foreign policy was not only intended to address secu-
rity issues: the Albanian Govemment laid its hopes for the country's
economic recovery and transformation on Westem assistance and Italy
responded promptiy and generously.^ At the same time, Italy represented
the symbol of the West in popular Albanian culture—no surprise given
that Italian state television RAI had virtually been Albanians' only
window to the west. The Albanian people as well as the Albanian elite
nurtured high expectations towards the role of the neighbouring country
for Albania's revitalization. Such high expectations also derived from
the behef that Italy had maintained a long silence during the Cold War,
and the time had come to somehow restore "the debt of long silence and
inattention."^
That is not to say that bilateral relations have been poor. On the
contrary, the determination of both parties to strengthen relations as well
as the fact that no political problems existed between the two countries,
have brought about a constant increase of political dialogue. In 1995, the
two countries signed the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, the first
to be signed with a Westem country since the regime change in Tirana.
In 1996, Italian President Scalfaro visited Albania, and gave assurances
of Italian support for the transformation and economic revival of Alba-
nia. The Socialist administration maintained the good tempo in political
contacts with Premier Berlusconi and Prime Minister Nano developing a
close personal relationship as well. It seems that this will continue after
the rotation of power in Tirana following the elections of July 2005—the
first visit abroad of Prime Minister Berisha was in Italy at the invitation
of Mr. Berlusconi. During more than one and a half decade, the parties
have maintained a good political understanding on their role and contri-
bution in the context of regional initiatives. Thus, for instance, in the
context ofthe Stability Pact, Italy has insisted for more attention towards
the so-called Westem Balkans.
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Nevertheless, Albanian-Italian relations followed the broader
pattern of West-East developments, where the initial wave of enthusiasm
was soon after overshadowed by uncertainty, since more time was
needed to accommodate to the new situation in order to better under-
stand the challenges and opportunities arising from the collapse of
communism. Within this climate of general uncertainty between East
and West, Albanian-Italian relations fell below expectations despite
remarkable achievements. There were four specific reasons for this: (a)
despite initial hopes, Albania did not prove to be the promised land for
Italian investments; (b) Albanian instability produced massive out-
migration towards Italy thus de-facto downgrading Albania from a
potential partner to a source of threats and destabilization in Italy's per-
ceptions; (c) the tension between friendship with Albania and a regional
policy that oscillated between Serbia-centred and Serbia-friendly made
Italian intentions seem more ambiguous and Albania more cautious; (d)
Italian perceptions that Albania had to choose between Rome or Athens
as opposed to Rome and Athens. Despite a powerful reservoir of good
will on the part of both nations, these differences in perceptions had a
negative impact on the state of political relationships.
From the very beginning, Italian enthusiasm was dampened by the
poverty, economic decline and social unrest that was the Albanian reality
in the early nineties. The initial assumption that Albania would become
the "promised land for investments" was associated with hesitancy: the
ways to exploit such opportunity were rather vague, at least in the per-
spective of political discourse. On 11 November 1992, these fears were
well-articulated in Italy's leading newspaper Corriere della Sera, which
published an article entitled "Is Albania Italy's DDR...?"8 Not only did
the massive waves of refugees and, later, illegal immigrants Italy show
that Italy lacked a clear vision on how to deal with its long-lost
neighbour but they also caused an intemal identity crisis in Italy, The
noted Italian columnist, Enzo Biagi, commented thus on the chaos of 8-
15 August 1991 caused by the first dramatic wave of refugees herded in
a stadium and ultimately expelled back to Albania:
The dream of the Albanians has dissolved, but so too has that of the
Italians, The fifth industrial power in the world has not been capa-
ble, in three days, of distributing ten thousand cups of coffee ..,
Those plastic sacks of water thrown from above to the dehydrated
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immigrants, those sandwiches scattered by the soldiers into the
scrambling mob—it was like being in a zoo,'
This age of uncertainty was reflected in Italy's erratic behaviour:
during the 1992 election campaign, the Italians publicly supported the
Socialists because of the close links between the Democratic Party and
the United States, Yet, given the extent ofthe country's bankruptcy and
the depth of popular resentment towards the ex-Communists, the fact
that Italy backed a losing horse is more indicative ofthe failure of Italian
diplomacy to recognize Albanian reality than the unpredictability of the
latter.
The ambiguity of political discourse in the early 90s was not only
due to the question "how to manage the big change" but it was also
linked to the political character of such relations. Whereas pro Italian
sentiments were popular in Albania at the time, and no hard feelings
persisted from the Second World War, a significant degree of prudence
was necessary lest this new era of relations resembled a client-patron
relationship. It is likely that the Albanian govemment interpreted the re-
quest of the Italian Govemment to extend the mission of the Pelikan
Operationio in Albania in light of this concem when it decided to tum it
down.l'
Another factor impacting bilateral relations is a contradiction inher-
ent in Italy's regional policy—and "the Albanian national question" that
is a key piece of the regional puzzle—and Italian policies towards the
Albanian state. Italy's economic penetration in Serbia'2 during the
Milosevic regime, symbolized by the signing of several large contracts
in the field of telecommunications between Italy and Serbia,'3 strongly
influenced Italy's stance towards Kosovo, Fear of undue German influ-
ence in Italy's "backyard" and the perception of Serbia as the strategic
pivot ofthe Balkans have been reflected'^ in a more "pro-Serbian" atti-
tude on the part of Italy when compared to other Westem nations. While
this has not impacted Albanian-Italian relations directly, it has made it
easier for successive Tirana governments to strategically prioritize rela-
tions with Washington and has contributed to an atmosphere of "silent
suspicion" in Tirana's political circles of Italy's intentions towards
Albania,
However, the affinity Italy has usually reflected towards Serbia
does not automatically translate into hostility towards Albanians in the
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Balkans and Kosovo in particular. Traditional Italian-German rivalry has
been put forward to explain Italy's stance
Italy has a vital interest in preventing the Balkans from becoming
subject to the German Sphere of influence. That result would
damage Italy's economic and commercial relations with the region
and with all of Eastern Europe, as well as run contrary to Italy's
status and its foreign relations policy.'^
This reasoning is however questionable. First, because it derives
from the old understanding of geopolitics where rivalry and conflict of
interests determined mutual perceptions and relationships. Second,
because Italy has strategic interests in the whole region, and exclusivity
with one member of the region at the expense of the rest of the region
could seriously damage this strategic goal. On the brink of Yugoslavia's
dissolution, Serbia was considered by Italy as well as by other European
countries as a key player for the region's stability. By supporting the
continuity of the Yugoslav Federation and then the stability of the
Milosevic regime, Italy aimed to preserve the status quo even though
that implied support of autocratic regimes in a setting where this was not
only unethical but also untenable. While this problem was not specific to
Italy—the USA also supported a "negative stability" at the beginning—
Italy proved to be more resistant to adapting its policies to the internal
dynamics of the region. Yet, it is difficult to measure to what extent
Albanian perceptions towards Italy have been influenced, by her "pro-
Serbian" attitude, at least until the Kosovo conflict of 1999. In a 2004
opinion poll, Albanians evaluate with almost the maximum score the
importance the Govemment should pay to strengthening relations with
Kosovo,'6 and indicate Italy as the most important European partner
(with 8.61 points out of ten).'^ Obviously, Albanians in proper Albania
nurture special feelings towards Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia or
Montenegro, Nevertheless, domestic crises and serious economic prob-
lems that have characterized post-communist Albania have prevented
her from looking beyond her borders. Yet, from the point of view of
bilateral relations, the Italian stand in the Contact Group has been a sen-
sitive issue for successive Albanian governments.'^ Now that the final
talks on Kosovo's status have begun, there is a new chance for an asser-
tive, inclusive regional approach that views the region as a whole as
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opposed to centred on one particular state. This is facilitated by the fact
that all countries in the region have now embarked on the process of
Euro-Atlantic integration which has provided them with a common
language and powerful incentives for cooperation.
Despite the strength of the post Cold War cooperation regimes in
European state relations, in regional affairs the traditions of realist com-
petition for spheres of influence continue to be relevant. This may be
illustrated by looking at the Italian-Albanian-Greek menage a trois—a
relationship that contains all of these trends however contradictory they
may be. While Greek-Albanian relations do not concem us directly, it is
important to point out that an atmosphere of mutual jealousy has often
characterized the Albanian commitments of these two EU countries.'9
The jealousy is not unjustified—in Albania, debates over the role
Italy and Greece may play in supporting Albania's EU integration proc-
ess tend to pose the dilemma "Rome or Athens?"^^ However, this
dilemma originates primarily from the intemal political stmggle between
democrats and socialists,2i rather than from the country's foreign policy.
This dilemma is built on the doubtful assumption that integration is an
external process, while it is clear that the preparation of Albania to
become a EU member is first and foremost dependant on the success of
intemal reforms. While the creation of intemal EU coalitions to support
one's membership will be key once a country has complied with the
Copenhagen criteria, these coalitions are less helpful in the early stages
of transition. Moreover, the tactic of playing one potential partner
against another is counter-productive. Hence, Albania has attempted to
escape this dilemma and operate through another approach: "Both Rome
and Athens," instead of "Rome or Athens,"22
Italy and Greece sometimes have been protagonists in this old-
fashioned realpolitik. For instance, the persistence of both Italian and
Greek govemments to allocate their military contingents in the frame-
work of Operation Alba respectively in areas such as Vlora and Kor^a
was officially justified with the necessity to undertake responsibilities
for the management of security issues in the respective borders. Never-
theless, agreement over the map of distribution of the multinational
European force (Operation Alba) was difficult, and the tendency to allo-
cate troops in former strategic zones became evident. Historical legacies
have an unfortunate way of becoming relevant in the most unfortunate
moments.
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1.2 The Economic Dimension
Looking at Albanian-Italian relations from the economic perspec-
tive it is not difficult to distinguish the Italian style of foreign policy
towards the Balkans: Italy is not a military power, its geopolicy must be
integrative, not expansive, and based on cultural and commercial rela-
tions (small and midsized Italian enterprises),23 Within this strategy, the
economic presence of Italy in Albania has been subject to growth with-
out marking significant peaks, but rather through a horizontal expansion
with small and medium enterprises, signed by a steady and noteworthy
cultural component that gives it solidity,
Italy contributed to and was in charge of intemational assistance
during a critical moment for Albania in 1991-1992. Italy is the main
donor of Albania in bilateral arrangements.24 Italian assistance is mainly
concentrated in infrastructure development, human resources develop-
ment and institution-building, which match the current needs of Alba-
nian economy.25
Statistics indicate that Italy is the main economic partner of Alba-
nia, Italy is ranked first in the field of investments,26 Furthermore, Italy
is ranked first in the list of Albania's trade partners, and it makes up 40
percent of Albanian trade transactions with foreign countries. From a
promising start in 1992-1993 economic relations dropped steadily due to
the 1997 crisis,27 However, in the regional context Italy has supported
infrastructure projects, as for instance Corridor 8, the realization of
which could bring Albania considerable economic benefits. Overall, the
economic dimension of bilateral relations has been the least problematic
ofthe three dimensions,
1.3 The Security Dimension
Nowhere are the three factors that we identified at the beginning of
this paper—historical legacy, regional violence and instability and Alba-
nia's chronic security crises—as structural determinants of Albanian-
Italian relations better illustrated than in the security dimension of this
relationship. In a region plagued with historical animosities, violent
instability and security vacuum, the dynamics of security sector coop-
eration play a central part in the perceptions of different actors towards
each other and the subsequent political moves that determine the state of
bilateral relations. While the political dimension of these relations
remains primai7 because that is where actor agency determines the
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outcome of the process, the security dimension provides the structural
background that constrains or enables particular behavioural patterns on
the part ofthe actors.
From a security perspective, strengthening relations with Italy has
been of primary importance to Albania, A weak state, with an almost
bankrupt economy, and scarce defence capacity, in an unstable region
where historical animosities were awakened almost overnight, needed
support in addressing security issues through the formation of alliances
or close bilateral security cooperation. Thus, Albania was the first of the
former Warsaw Treaty members to apply for NATO membership
(December 1992), while it simultaneously sought to strengthen bilateral
relations with the Euro-Atlantic alliance members, including Italy,
Strengthening relations with Italy was not only imperative because Italy
is a NATO member but also since the geographic setting of the two
countries and their mutually compatible value systems allow for com-
plimentarity in security goais. Besides seeking alliance-seeking, the first
non-communist administration also focused on the reformation of
defence forces, in order to adapt them to the new political system as well
as enhance their reliability in case of confiict. Italy, along with USA,
Germany and Turkey were the main supporters of the restructuring
process of Albanian armed forces. Since 1992 many Albanian military
officials have attended the Italian Defence Academy, while Italy contin-
ues to provide assistance, through material and technological support
and training programs for armed forces^s and law enforcement bodies.
Overall, the level of cooperation in the security sector has been satisfac-
tory and productive in generating the stability necessary for Albania's
economic and political development. Now Albania is well into the
NATO membership process having accepted an ambitious Partnership
Goals package in 2002 that is designed to make the country ready for
membership by 2010. Without Italian initiatives in Operation Pelican
(1992) and Italian leadership in the multinational Operation Alba (1997),
as well as all the other forms of aid enumerated above, it is highly doubt-
ful that Albania would have gotten so far.
However, in order to comprehend better Italian perceptions of
Albania as the sine qua non of understanding post-communist Albanian
Italian relations, we have to view bilateral security relations through the
three prisms enumerated above. First, the historical legacy of cultural
affinity but bilateral competition and suspicion was the least important
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factor of the three, Albanian historical memory favoured the retention of
the cultural ties while the Fascist invasion and the distrust of the interwar
period were largely, if not completely, forgotten. While in the early
nineties Albania tended to oscillate between close military cooperation
with Italy due to the acute needs of the country and distrust of Italian
intentions, after 1995 the political will of both countries favoured close
relations and they were reflected in numerous initiatives and institutional
ties between the security structures of both countries.
The second factor is related to the imminent security concems origi-
nating from Yugoslavia's dissolution and regional destabilisation. Even
if Albania was not to be involved in the conflict, it could potentially
become the main bridge for exporting insecurities to the Italian coasts.
Moreover, the threats deriving from the region were not traditional secu-
rity threats. Instead, they were related to massive migration flows, the
rise of organized crime and other non-state structures whose tentacles
could spread to Italy through migration. In order to justify continued
Italian involvement in the region, Italian Foreign Minister Beniamino
Andreatta wamed Italians in 1993 that "Italy no longer simply follows
other countries, but has to be prepared and able to act too,"29
Last, but not least, the chronic crises of post communist Albania
created a perception of Albania as a threat to be managed rather than an
opportunity. The 1991 crisis, followed by massive refugee waves
towards the Italian coast, dampened initial enthusiasm about the re-
emergence of the old neighbour and constituted the first alert of a new
security concem. Further on, the 1997 crisis reinforced the belief that
neighbouring Albania was a serious security concem, Italy became
heavily engaged in resolving this crisis, through political action and
direct assistance in the restoration of law and order. In this context, the
Albanian crisis was an opportunity for Italy to assume a decisive role in
regional developments, and it represented a test for Italian ambitions and
capacity to successfully address these pressing security issues. Indeed,
the whole Albanian case was seen very much as a test case for Italy in
terms of its credibility in the EU and Atlantic Alliance.30
Finally, the generally weak state of security institutions in Albania
was another factor under consideration in Italy: Albania continued to be
the most convenient transit way to Italy and the EU for third nationals—
not only from the region, but from the Middle East and Asia as well.
Thus, a considerable number of bilateral agreements in the security field
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aim at addressing issues relating to border management and control, pre-
vention of illegal migration, illegal trafficking, and organised crime,3'
Conclusions: Managing Threats or Opportunities?
Albanian Italian relations have been intensive during the last one
and a half-decade, especially from the political perspective. Economi-
cally, Italy is the most important partner of Albania, in terms of invest-
ments and trade exchange volume. In addition, military and security co-
operation with Italy has been thorough and highly valued by Albanian
authorities. However, despite all the arguments in favour of the good
achievements in bilateral relations and co-operation, some scholars
assert that they could have been taken further. The assumption that Italy
is still maintaining a low profile in Albania, as well as in the Balkans is
widely accepted. This belief may originate from the originally high ex-
pectations of Albanian society with regard to the role Italy could have
assumed in the Balkans due to geographical proximity and Albanian
affinity towards Italian culture.32 Nevertheless, a more profound analysis
of bilateral relations reveals that the level of political relationships be-
tween the two countries has lagged behind the economic one,^^ although
both post 1990 administrations—Democratic and Socialist—have
assigned priority to relations with Italy. According to local economic
experts, although Italy still remains Albania's principal economic part-
ner, no considerable progress has been marked in the field, and Italian
investments have only been restored to pre-1997 crisis quotes,34
Leaving aside the high expectations of the Albanian elite, relations
between the two countries have been close, ever more dynamic and fruit-
ful. Yet, Italy has gained little more than the stabilization of its volatile
neighbour while Albanians remain convinced that Italy could be more
actively involved. Indeed, Italy is capable of playing a greater role in
Albania, Thus, during the 1997 crisis, the Italian Govemment mediated
between the government (Democratic Party) and the opposition (Social-
ist Party). They accepted this reconciliation attempt, despite the deep
divergences existing among the two,35 Moreover, Italy has assumed a
more active role in Albania in the context of the European Union, Dur-
ing the 1997 crisis in Albania, the European Union showed reluctance in
sending military troops upon the request of Albanian President Berisha.
Nonetheless, Italy responded to this request for assistance. Naturally,
this Italian initiative was largely motivated by Italy's security interests in
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re-establishing law and order and stability in the neighbouring country.
The multinational force that was allocated in Albania consisted of Euro-
pean troops, but it never became a EU mission.36 After the conclusion of
Operation Alba, Rome was the organizing capital for the intemational
conference on Albania on 31 July 1997, and later on of several other
meetings, among which a donor's conference in October 1997, which
encouraged the participation of many countries and intemational organi-
zations. This example illustrates how active Italian involvement can be
highly beneficial to both countries.
The unexplored potentials of the relationship may be emphasized
when considering that the highest and most intensive level of political
relations between the two countries was experienced during the Albanian
crises of the 1990s, According to Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, Italian
policy towards Albania has always been sporadic, merely at limiting
threats: "a firm and permanent interest of the Italian govemment towards
Albania seems almost unlikely in the absence of potential crises or
commotions on the other side of the Adriatic.''^' Thus, rather than
economic opportunity and mutually beneficial security and political
cooperation, Rome has generally perceived Albania as a source of insta-
bility and security threats. The diplomatic version of this argument can
be found on the official site of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs-
Balkan Section,
The Western Balkans and particularly Albania seem to be trapped in
this perception of a portal from where dangers emerge and behind which
threats lurk. While this is not unjustified, the danger of Albanian and
non-Albanian migratory waves have usually been inflated even at the
worst of times. Allegations of a weak stand towards Albanian migration
put Prodi's govemment in serious difficulty in 1997. However, the phe-
nomenon was magnified in terms of size and potential threat, while in
reality it barely amounted to ten thousand people, most of which women
and children. Ever since, Albania has ceased being a transit country for
illegal immigrants while its contribution as a country of origin has also
been minimized thanks to the resources that Albanian, Italian and other
Western countries have poured into combating human trafficking.
The infiated danger of migratory waves, especially in relation to the
exportation of organized crime in the European Union through Italy as
an EU front line state, has influenced policy priorities of some EU coun-
tries (including Italy) conceming the Balkans and Albania in particular.
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The priority of the intemational community and the European Union in
particular remains higher security of intemational borders in order to
reduce illegal migration, monitoring and relocate emigrants while the
needs of the origin countries are not taken under serious consideration.^^
Financial support has also been channelled according to this priority.
Accordingly, in the case of Albania, from 2002 to 2004 the EU has
agreed to spend 49 million pounds on issues relating to border manage-
ment, police and judiciary reform, but only 29 million on economic and
social development,^'
However, stronger Italian interest in Albania would be justified by
Albanian needs and the strategic interest Italy has expressed in creating
an altemative Southem axis as opposed to the "Northem axis" of
Europe.40 Italy has already assumed a privileged role in the relations of
the European Union with Albania. As an Italian diplomat says, "the
ultimate aim of Italy's policy in the Balkans must be to integrate the
entire area with itself and with Europe through the agency of Italy.""*'
However, it is unclear how Italian actions on the ground so far have
contributed to that goal. It was mainly due to Italian and Greek efforts
that the Westem Balkans was included with priority in the EU agenda in
the Thessaloniki summit, thus offering for the first time a European
perspective to these often 'forgotten' neighbours. Moreover, Albania
considers Italy as an advocate within the European Union.
Thus, a new "Italian Ostpolitik"—a policy that aims at projecting
and deepening Italy's presence in Southeastem Europe—needs to be put
in place.̂ z Italian strategic considerations and Albanian wishes converge
at this point. Such an Ostpolitik would first and foremost aim to clear the
ambiguity surrounding Italian views of the region, an ambiguity that was
accepted by Romano Prodi when he stated: "a rapidly changing world
means that we must have a clear idea of what lies in our power to
achieve and where we are heading even before we grapple with the
problems of the present or come to terms with the events of our past.'"'^
Calls for a new role of Italy in the Balkans and Adriatic where
Albania would be an important factor and enjoy its benefits have started
to emerge in the light of new developments in the context of EU
enlargement. Italian former Minister of Foreign Affairs Gianni De
Michelis remarked that EU enlargement towards northeast should induce
Italy to accelerate the integration of the Balkans into the larger European
family. Otherwise, the establishment of "Baltic Europe" would, in geo-
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political terms, inexorably leave Italy in Europe's peripheral margins.
With the accession ofthe Balkans into EU, the geopolitical balance will
be restored,44
More than half a centui7 ago, Ahmet Zog, King of Albanians would
write: "I fear a weak Italy. I do not fear a strong Italy. A strong Italy is
the Italy that wishes for a stable, well-organized and independent
Albania." Zog's maxim preserves its relevance in the modem world:
even more than during the agitated times of his reign in Albania, his
geopolitical thinking is relevant in the actual developments of Italian-
Albanian relations.
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